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UNITED STATES V. RAMSEY:
WARRANTLESS SEARCH SANCTIONED BY
THE SUPREME COURT
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Ramsey' the United States Supreme Court, for
the first time in its history,2 determined the permissible scope of searches
of international letter class mail3 entering this country from abroad. Prior
to this case, only the circuit courts of appeals had litigated the border
search issue, and they had come to varying conclusions.4 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Ramsey to resolve the conflict. 5 The Ramsey
decision 6 has settled this question and has given guidelines to the lower
courts when future cases involving the border search issue arise.7
The border search doctrine has traditionally been considered to be
1. 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977).
2. See United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1974).
3. International letter class mail was defined in 39 C.F.R. §12.1 (1975) to include
"letters and packages paid at the letter rate of postage, post cards and aerogrammes."
This classification is analogous to domestic first class mail in that letter class mail is
transported by the fastest method available and at the highest rate. 39 C.F.R. §§ 12.1, 12.2
(1975). These regulations were substantially identical to Postal Service Publication 42
(Postal Service Regulations on International Mail). This publication is now incorporated
by reference in 39 C.R.F. § 10.5 (1977), under authority of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970 & Supp.
V 1975), and §§ 12.1 and 12.2 are no longer in force.
4. "The right to search at the border without a search warrant is called the border
search." Comment, Search and Seizure at the Border-The Border Search, 21 RUTGERS
L. REV. 513, 516 (1967).
The following courts of appeals cases have held that international mail may be opened
without probable cause and without a warrant, pursuant to the border search exception to
the fourth amendment: United States v. Milroy, 538 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 924 (1976); United States v. King, 517 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975); United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1088 (1974).
Other courts of appeals have indicated that international letter class mail may be
governed by the same standards as mailed packages crossing the borders. United States v.
Doe, 472 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Beckley,
335 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 922 (1965). Both of these cases upheld
the warrantless opening of mailed packages. The First Circuit, however, has reserved the
question of letters. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888-89 (1st Cir. 1976).
5. 97 S.Ct. 56 (1977).
6. 97 S.Ct. 1972 (1977).
7. Id.
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an exception to the fourth amendment.' It has been applied to travelers, 9
vehicles,' ° baggage," and most recently, to international mail.12 The
justification for such warrantless searches is based in part upon the need
of the nation to protect its boundaries. 13 Other rationales offered by the
various courts which have heard the issue are:14 (1) Congress has histor-
ically permitted such searches,15 (2) international travelers expect to have
to disclose their identities and the contents of their belongings at the
border-i.e., there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, 16 (3) the
government's interest in controlling border traffic outweighs an individu-
al's privacy interests, 17 (4) the impracticality of obtaining a warrant for
the huge volume of traffic across the border necessitates dispensing with
the requirement,18 and (5) it is frequently impossible to obtain a warrant
when dealing with mobile subjects. 19
Although the border search "exception" has become quite expan-
sive, 20 this note will focus only on the problem of international mail, by
analyzing the decision in United States v. Ramsey21 in light of prior cases
and statutes.22
H. FACTS
Customs officials, operating under statutory authority,23 opened
8. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-54 (1925).
9. Id. Travelers have been subjected to such indignities as intrusive body cavity
searches, rectal and vaginal examinations, and the induction of vomiting. See generally
Comment, Border Searches-A Prostitution of the Fourth Amendment, 10 ARIz. L. REV.
457 (1968); Comment, The Reasonableness of Border Searches, 4 CAL. W.L. REV. 355
(1968); Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968).
10. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In this case, vehicles
were stopped 100 miles from the border and the passengers were briefly questioned.
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants was searched, and examination was limited to visual
inspection by field officers. These procedures provided sufficient protection for the
constitutionality of the warrantless "search" to be upheld.
11. United States v. Page, 277 F. 459 (D.Va. 1921).
12. United States v. Ramsey, 97 S.Ct. 1972 (1977).
13. Id. at 1979; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-54 (1925).
14. See generally Note, Border Search Exception Held Inapplicable to International
Letter Mail [U.S. v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1976)], 1976 GEO. WASH. L.Q. 493,
495; 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 274 (1976).
15. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925). See also Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969).
16. United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 525 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976).
18. See, e.g., King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1965).
19. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
20. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970); Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 317 (1971).
21. 97 S.Ct. 1972 (1977).
22. See note 4 supra, and 97 S.Ct. at 1976.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970); See note 38 infra for the text thereof.
1977]
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eight envelopes with Washington, D.C. addresses entering the United
States from Thailand.24 The envelopes were "rather bulky" and were
sent from a "known source of narcotics.'"26 After feeling and weighing
the letters, the customs inspector opened them, and found heroin as
suspected. 7 No search warrant was obtained until the letters were sent to
the Drug Enforcement Administration in Washington, D.C. 28 Instead,
the letters were opened on the mere suspicion that the envelopes
contained contraband. 29 The envelopes were then resealed and sent to
their respective addresses, whereupon federal agents arrested the
addressees and their accomplices.90
The defendants were convicted in the district court, and the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the convictions.31
The majority32 of the circuit court concluded that the values protected by
the first 33 and fourth34 amendments demand that a showing of probable
cause 35 be made to, and a warrant 36 secured from, a neutral magistrate
24. 97 S.Ct. at 1975.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1976. It is interesting to note that Thai officials had placed respondents
under surveillance after being alerted by West German authorities of the narcotics opera-
tion. Thai officials arrested Bailey and Ward, accomplices of Ramsey, and seized eleven
heroin-filled envelopes addressed to the Washington, D.C. area. These envelopes were
later connected with respondents. However, customs officials in New York City had no
knowledge of these events when they opened the letters in question. Id. at 1975.
28. Id. at 1976.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
32. Chief Judge McGowan wrote the opinion, in which Tamm, J. joined. Robb, J.
filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
33. U.S. CONsT. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
34. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
35. The court delineated a "by no means exclusive list of facts that would tend to
establish probable cause." 538 F.2d 415, 421 n.8 (1976). The facts listed were:
the size of the letter; whether inspection by x-ray or sniffing by a trained dog
corroborates any suspicion; whether feeling the package from the outside gives
reason to suspect contraband; the country of origin; an unusual and suspicious
address or return address; an unusual number of letters sent from and/or to the
same address within a short period of time; a reasonable basis to believe that the
sender or recipient is engaged in smuggling; and so forth.
" 'Probable cause' for search without warrant exists where facts and circumstances
within officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense
has been or is being committed." Riccardi v. Perini, 417 F.2d 645, 648 (6th Cir. 1969).
36. The circuit court limited the scope of the warrant to inspection of the mail for
[Vol. 13:322
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before international mail is opened.3 7 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the customs inspector had "reasonable cause to suspect ' 38
that there was dutiable merchandise or contraband in the envelopes, that
the search was authorized by statute, 9 was an exception to the fourth
amendment, and did not impermissibly "chill" the exercise of the right
of free speech, protected by the first amendment. 4'
Ill. DISCUSSION
In ruling that international first class letter mail fell within the
border search exception to the fourth amendment, the majority of the
Supreme Court focused on the statute involved,4" and stated that the
search was plainly authorized by this legislation.42 The test imposed by
19 U.S.C. § 482 is mere "reasonable cause to suspect", 43 a much less
stringent test than the standard of probable cause required by the fourth
amendment. 4 The Court stated that the customs statute involved45 gave
customs officials plenary power to conduct border searches. They looked
to the predecessors of the current border search statute 1 and concluded
that since the same Congress which had proposed the fourth amendment
contraband; such a warrant does not authorize the reading of any communication
contained inside. 538 F.2d 415, 421 n.9 (1976).
37. Id.
38. The test provided for in 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970) is as follows:
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop,
search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any
vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is
merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the
United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by person in possession or
charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search any
trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to
suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law; and if any such
officer or other person so authorized shall find any merchandise on or about any
such vehicle, beast, or person, or in any such trunk or envelope, which he shall
have reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty, or to have been unlawfully
introduced into the United States, whether by the person in possession or charge,
or by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure the
same for trial.
39. Id.
40. 97 S.Ct. at 1982-83.
41. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970); See note 38 supra for the text thereof.
42. 97 S.Ct. at 1976. With respect to the issue of standing, the Supreme Court took
notice that neither court below had considered whether Ramsey or Kelly had standing to
object to the opening of the envelopes, since none of the envelopes was addressed to
them. Consequently the Supreme Court did not reach that issue. Id. at n.7.
43. See note 38 supra.
44. 97 S.Ct. at 1976-78. See United States v. King, 517 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1975);
cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 21-22, 27 (1968) (standard for a "stop and frisk" held to
be less than probable cause).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
46. Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 3, 14 Stat. 178 (1866); Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 94,
§§ 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232 (1815); Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).
4
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had also proposed the first border search statute,47 Congress did not
consider border searches unreasonable, and hence such searches were not
violative of the fourth amendment.48
The Court noted that import restrictions on persons or packages at
the national border rest on different rules of constitutional law than do
restrictions on the movements of packages and persons within the na-
tion.49 The rationale underlying this distinction was based upon the
interest in national self protection. 50 From the cases examined, the Court
concluded that border searches have historically been considered "rea-
sonable" by the mere fact that the person or item in question had entered
the country from outside. 51
The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals52 and stated
that the inclusion of international mail within the border search exception
was not an extension of that exception. 53 The majority believed that the
critical factor was that the envelopes crossed the border and entered this
country, because the border search exception has its foundation in the
right of the sovereign to control who and what may enter the country. 54
As to the first amendment issue, the Court stated that the existing
system of border searches has not been shown to invade first amendment
rights, and that there is no reason to think that the potential presence of
correspondence makes the search unreasonable. 55 Because a postal regu-
lation56 prohibits the reading of correspondence without a warrant, the
Supreme Court held that first amendment values are protected, and that
the opening of international mail does not impermissibly chill the exer-
cise of free speech. 57 The Court also noted that there was no statutorily
created expectation of privacy and only a limited justifiable expectation
of privacy for incoming material crossing the national border. 58
47. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).
48. 97 S.Ct. at 1979-80.
49. Id. (citing United States v. 12, 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123,
125 (1973)).
50. 97 S.Ct. at 1979. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
51. 97 S.Ct. at 1979.
52. See 538 F.2d 415, 421 (1976).
53. 97 S.Ct. at 1981.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1982.
56. 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 (1977) states: "No customs officer or employee shall read or
authorize or allow any other person to read any correspondence contained in sealed letter
mail of foreign origin unless a search warrant has been obtained in advance from an
appropriate judge or U.S. magistrate which authorizes such action." Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1702
(1970) (criminal sanctions).
57. 97 S.Ct. at 1982-83.
58. Id. at 1982 n.17 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (1970); United States v. King, 517 F.2d
350, 354 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 985 (2d Cir. 1973)).
[Vol. 13:322
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Justice Powell qualified his brief concurring opinion with the
"understanding that the precedential effect of today's decision does not
go beyond the validity of mail searches at the border pursuant to the
statute.' '59 With such a qualification, Powell believed that the statute
adequately protects both first and fourth amendment rights.60
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall dissented,61 noting that the
earlier practice, followed for over 105 years, was that customs officials
could open mail only in the presence, and with consent of, the address-
ees.62 The dissent outlined five reasons for their belief that Congress did
not authorize such secret searches of private mail.6" First, legislative
history demonstrated Congress' respect for the individual's interest in the
privacy of his communications. 6 Second, the history of the 1866 stat-
ute, 65 predecessor to 19 U.S.C. § 482, showed the concern of the
legislators that the statutory language might encompass the search and
seizure of the United States mails. 66 Third, the dissent emphasized that
the word "envelope" was "buried deep in the first long sentence. . . of
the Act, '67 and that contemporary American dictionaries6 emphasized
the usage of the word as describing a package or wrapper as well as an
ordinary letter. Thus, the language would not refer to ordinary letters. 69
Fourth, "the consistent construction of statutory authority by a series of
changing administrations over a span of 105 years must be accorded great
respect."70 If a new rule is to be adopted, it is up to Congress to do so.
Finally, the dissenters noted the weakness of the asserted justification for
the broad power claimed. The fear of the majority that the addressee
would withhold consent for the opening of the envelope is groundless,
because that fact would be one of the factors considered in a determina-
tion of probable cause.71 In concluding, the dissent voiced concern that
59. 97 S.Ct. at 1983 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. 97 S.Ct. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1983-84, (citing, Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1882)). This practice
was followed unless a search warrant supported by probable cause was obtained.
63. 97 S.Ct. at 1984-87.
64. Id. See 116 CONG. REc. 20481 (1970). (History of the defeat of an amendment
which would have imposed a specific warrant requirement on opening of international
mails showed the importance of the issue).
65. Act of July 18, 1866, 14 Stat. 178 (1866).
66. 97 S.Ct. at 1984 & n.3.
67. Id. at 1985.
68. Id. at 1986. The dissent cited the following dictionaries in support of its position:
J. Worchster, Dictionary of the English Language (1860); N. Webster, An American
Dictionary of the English Language (C. Goodrich & A. Porter 1869).
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 416 U.S. 267, 274-75, (1974); Helvering
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the "door will be open to wholesale, secret examination of all incoming
international letter mail. "72 No notice would be necessary either before
or after the search, and the Court should leave to Congress such a policy
decision which affects important personal rights.7 3
IV. LAW
The border search exception to the fourth amendment has been a
part of the American legal system since the earliest days of this country.7 4
The first border search statute75 was passed in 1789 to regulate the
collection of duties at the border. 76 This statute predated the Bill of
Rights, although both were proposed by the same Congress.77 Section 24
of this Act7" provided that if merchandise subject to duties was illegally
concealed in a "dwelling house, store, building, or other place," a
warrant should be issued upon a showing of probable cause. 79 This Act
distinguished the warrantless procedures for inspecting goods in a mov-
ing vehicle where the goods were out of reach of a warrant from those
procedures involving goods that were in a non-mobile place such as a
dwelling. s0 After two reenactments, 1 this statute was codified into the
Act of July 18, 1866.82 That act makes brief references to an "envelope"
72. Id. at 1987.
73. Id.
74. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-54 (1925).
75. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).
76. Id. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
77. See 97 S.Ct. at 1979.
78. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 24 (1789).
79. Id.
80. See Note, United States v. Ramsey: Fourth Amendment Protection for Interna-
tional Letters, 22 S.D.L. REV. 236, 238 n.18 (1977).
81. Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 94, §§ 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232 (1815) (allowing customs
officals to search vehicles, beasts, or persons suspected of bearing contraband or dutiable
merchandise.) This act expired in 1816, but the substance of § 2 was reenacted in the Act
of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 3, 14 Stat. 178 and was embodied in the Revised Statutes, 3061.
82. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act read as follows:
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted. That it shall be lawful for any officer of the
customs, including inspectors and occasional inspectors, or of a revenue cutter,
or authorized agent of the Treasury Department, or other person specially ap-
pointed for the purpose in writing by a collector, naval officer, or surveyor of the
customs, to go on board of any vessel, as well without as within his district, and
to inspect, search, and examine the same, and any person, trunk, or envelope on
board, and to this end, to hail and stop such vessel if under way, and to use all
necessary force to compel compliance; and if it shall appear that any breach or
violation of the laws of the United States has been committed, whereby or in
consequence of which, such vessel, or the goods, wares, and merchandise, or any
part thereof, on board of or imported by such vessel, is or are liable to forfeiture,
to make seizure of the same, or either or any part thereof, and to arrest, or in case
of escape, or any attempt to escape, to pursue and arrest any person engaged in
such breach or violation: Provided. That the original appointment in writing of
any person specially appointed as aforesaid shall be filed in the custom-house
where such appointment is made.
7
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in § 2 and § 3.83 However, the dissent in Ramsey points out that the word
'envelope" was not used to refer to ordinary letters.84
This Act has since been recodified into 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).85
The language of the 1866 statute, "to search any trunk or envelope,
wherever found," was retained in the recodification, 86 and the Supreme
Court in Ramsey gave life to this phrase. The standard for such a search
has also remained the same as it was in 1866-i.e., "reasonable cause to
believe." '87
First class domestic mail has traditionally been accorded the highest
expectation of privacy.88 In Ex Parte Jackson,89 the letter involved was a
circular advertising a lottery which offered prizes. The letter was mailed
completely within the national boundaries, and its mailing violated a
specific customs statute.' ° In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court
established the rule that "letters and sealed packages can only be opened
under warrant like that issued when papers in one's household are
subjected to search." 91 However, this rule has not been carried over to
international letter mail, as the cases indicate. Instead, international mail
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted. That any of the officers or persons authorized
by the second section of this act to board or search vessels may stop, search, and
examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast, or
person on which or whom he or they shall suspect, there are goods, wares, or
merchandise which are subject to duty or shall have been introduced into the
United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in possession
or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search
any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause
to suspect there are goods which were imported contrary to law; and if such
officer or other person so authorized as aforesaid shall find any goods wares, or
merchandise, on or about any such vehicle, beast, or person, or in any such trunk
or envelope, which he shall have reasonable cause to believe are subject to duty,
or to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States, whether by the
person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast, or
otherwise, he shall seize and secure the same for trial.
Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, §§ 2, 3, 145 Stat. 178-179 (1866).
83. Id.
84. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 38 supra for the text of the statute. Postal Regulations which implement
the authority of customs officials to search incoming international mail are found in 19
C.F.R. §§ 145.1-145.4 (1977) and 39 C.F.R. § 10.5 (1977). This latter section incorporates
by reference Postal Service Publication 42, § 821 (1977). See note 3 supra.
86. Id.; See note 82 supra.
87. See notes 38 and 82 supra. It is interesting to note that courts have required a
more stringent test than mere suspicion for certain types of border searches. For example,
"real suspicion" is required for a strip search, and a "clear indication" is required for
examination of body cavities. E.g., Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.
1967); Rempe, Border Searches-A Prostitution of the Fourth Amendment, 10 ARiz. L.
REV. 457 (1968).
88. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
89. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
90. Id. at 728.
91. Id. at 733.
8
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is treated in the same way as are international travelers or baggage, under
the guise of the border search doctrine.
The first case to uphold a warrantless search of international travel-
ers was Carroll v. United States.92 In that case, the defendants were
convicted of transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile, in viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Act. 93 Federal prohibition agents were
engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids,
looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. When the defendants' car
approached the agents' post, the agents pursued them but lost trace of
them in East Lansing. Two months later, the same agents met and passed
the defendants in the same automobile, again coming from the direction
of Detroit toward Grand Rapids. 94 The government agents turned and
followed the defendants, stopped them and searched the car. The results
of the search, sixty-eight bottles of liquor, led to defendants' arrest and
subsequent conviction.95 The United States Supreme Court held that the
mobility of the travelers was an exigent circumstance 96 which justified
the application of the border search doctrine.
In United States v. Beckley 97 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit upheld the warrantless opening of an international package. 98 The
case involved the importation of marijuana by means of a sealed package
deposited in the United States mail in the Panama Canal Zone. First class
postage was not paid for this parcel, and a declaration was attached to it
indicating that it contained only personal items. A customs entry clerk in
Miami became suspicious that the package contained items other than
those listed, and he opened the package without obtaining a search
warrant. The parcel was examined, and after it was confirmed that it
contained marijuana, the package was rewrapped and sent on to the
addressee. Thereafter, a search warrant was obtained, and the contents of
the package were seized in the defendant's home. 99 The circuit court
stated that the requirement of a warrant applied if first class postage had
92. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
93. Id. at 134.
94. Id. at 135.
95. Id. at 136.
96. "[E]xigent circumstances" means an emergency situation requiring swift
action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to
forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence. . . . (I]n
each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts
known to the officers.
People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
97. 335 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1964).
98. Id. at 88.
99. Id. at 87.
[Vol. 13:322
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been paid on mail moving entirely within the country. 00 This court said
that an imported parcel post package could be opened "without formality
even though sealed.""'l The court indicated a willingness to apply the
same standard to first class mail coming into the country, especially
where, as here, there was some representation that the package contained
merchandise. 102
Another case involving packages was United States v. Sohnen.103 In
this case, customs officials opened a package containing dutiable gold
coins. The package was referred to a customs agent because there was
suspicion that the package might contain dutiable or prohibited matter.
The weight and feel of the package were unusual, and it did not bear the
required label stating that it could be opened for customs inspection.
After taking the precaution of performing a spectroscopic examination,
customs agents opened the package."o This search was contrary to postal
regulations, 0 5 and the parcel was opened without first obtaining a search
warrant. 106 In holding that the search was reasonable within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, 0 7 the district court found that the government's
interest in national self-protection outweighed the individual's right to
privacy. 08 However, the court recognized that the Constitution may
"well prevent the opening of letters, as opposed to packages containing
merchandise without a search warrant." 1 9
United States v. Doe10 also involved a package mailed from
abroad. In this case, the package was mailed from Colombia to an
address in Bridgeport, Connecticut. The package was opened because it
was labeled "old clothing," and the mail entry clerk testified that from
100. Id. at 88 (citing In re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878); Oliver v. United States, 239
F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957)).
101. 335 F.2d at 88.
102. 335 F.2d at 89.
103. 298 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
104. Id. at 53.
105. The "postal regulations" then in force provided that "if there is reason to believe
that prohibited matter is contained in a sealed letter," a notice is to be sent to the
addressee requesting authorization to open the letter and examine its contents"; if au-
thorization is not given the letter is to be returned "unopened, to its origin." Then
appearing as 39 C.F.R. § 262.1 (1969). See 39 C.F.R. § 10.5, Parts 821-822 (1977) (incor-
porating by reference Postal Service Publication 42, International Mail) for a comparison
of current regulations. See note 3 supra.
106. 298 F. Supp. at 53.
107. The court stated that the determination as to whether an administrative search
was "reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment involves balancing the
government's "need to know" against the individual's right of privacy. Id. at 54.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 55 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886), and In re
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878)). See also note 34 supra.
110. 472 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1973).
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his experience such labelling often belied the true contents-new cloth-
ing, subject to a duty. III Upon opening the package, the clerk discovered
cocaine. The package was resealed after some innocuous white powder
was substituted for a portion of the cocaine, and the package was
delivered to the defendant. Customs officers then arrested him as he was
about to board a train for New York City. 112 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that 19 U.S.C. § 482113 authorized the warrantless
opening of an international package entering the United States from
abroad. 114 The court intimated that international envelopes would be
treated in the same manner.11 5
United States v. Odland"6 was the first case to rule directly on the
opening of international first class mail without a warrant. In Odland, an
envelope mailed from Colombia was found to contain cocaine. The
inspection of the envelope occurred during the routine examination of
parcels and envelopes arriving in the United States from abroad. 117
Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that
international mail fell within the border search exception," 8 it failed even
to discuss the first amendment interests involved. Instead, the court held
that a first class envelope was subject to search at the border merely
because it entered the United States from abroad. 1 9
The First Circuit, in United States v. Emery,12° agreed with the
Odland court with regard to packages, but reserved judgment on the
question of letters. 2 ' Emery involved two packages mailed from
Colombia which contained cocaine. An unusual circumstance in this case
was that federal agents opened the packages and inserted an electronic
"beeper" without obtaining a warrant for this purpose. The defendant
picked the packages up at the post office and went to his apartment. He
was followed by federal agents who maintained surveillance and
monitored the beeper's signal. A search warrant was obtained, and the
apartment was entered after the defendant had opened the packages. 122
111. Id. at 983.
112. Id. at 984.
113. See note 38 supra for the text thereof.
114. 472 F.2d at 984.
115. Id. at 985.
116. 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1974). See Note, United States v. Ramsey: Fourth Amend-
ment Protection for International Letters, 22 S.D.L. REV. 236, 243 (1976).
117. 502 F.2d at 150.
118. Id. at 151.
119. Id. See also United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975), where the court
applied Odland to a different set of facts.
120. 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 888-89.
122. Id. at 888.
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The court said that since the appellant could have no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy as to the contraband, the insertion of the beeper did not
violate his constitutionally protected freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 123
In United States v. Barclift24 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the mere entry of mail into the United States from a
foreign country was sufficient reason for a border search of that mail. 125
Envelopes entering this country from Bogota, Colombia were seized
from defendant's automobile glove compartment. At the port of entry,
the envelopes had been examined by customs officials and the
contraband (cocaine) discovered. A lawful surveillance of the delivery of
the mail led to one of the defendants, who was arrested with the cocaine
in his possession.126 The court saw "no reason" for distinguishing
between the entry of mail into the United States and the entry of
automobiles or baggage. The court said that a border search of mail is
subject to a general test of reasonableness. 27
Two years later, in United States v. King,128 the fifth circuit upheld
an extended border search of international mail. In that case, no search
was made at the port of entry, but the mail was searched later during the
delivery process in Birmingham, Alabama. The court said that this fact
alone did not make the search unreasonable by fourth amendment stan-
dards.1 29 Ten envelopes were removed from the ordinary mail channels
for possible inspection because they felt "thicker than an ordinary Christ-
mas card." 130 They were given to a postal inspector who forwarded them
to a customs supervisor of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The
supervisor tapped the envelopes on a hard surface; a distinct cushion of
powdery material appeared. This prompted the supervisor to open the
envelopes, and he found heroin, as he had suspected. A sample was
taken from each envelope, and the envelopes were returned to the Postal
Service for delivery. The defendants were ultimately arrested, although
no search warrant had been obtained for the opening of the envelopes.
Noting that international travelers do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy, and that the government has a strong interest in policing the
traffic crossing its borders, the court refused to suppress the evidence
123. Id. at 890.
124. 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).
125. Id. at 1075 (citing Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973)).
126. 514 F.2d at 1074.
127. Id. at 1074-75.
128. 517 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1975).
129. Id. at 353-354.
130. Id. at 351.
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which had been obtained without a search warrant. 13'
In United States v. Milroy, 132 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld another warrantless search of international mail. The facts
in Milroy were similar to those in Ramsey in that heroin was mailed from
Thailand. Unlike Ramsey, however, in this case a specially trained dog
had "sniffed out" the envelopes in question as containing narcotics, and
each envelope had been mailed on the same day, to the same person, at
the same address. The court delineated the various rationales that other
courts had used to justify border searches, 13 3 but failed to adopt any such
justifications, saying: "Under any standard, the customs officials were
entitled to open the envelopes without a search warrant." 3 4
Thus, there was a conflict between the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia and every other circuit which had litigated the issue.
When the United States Supreme Court was called upon to resolve the
conflict, they ruled in favor of the government, at the expense of precious
individual rights.
V. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Ramsey, the majority 135 of the United States
Supreme Court reasoned that warrantless searches at the border were
reasonable simply because they occur at the border.'3 6 This circular
argument appears unsound, particularly when values protected by the
first and fourth amendments are involved. The court noted a "longstand-
ing, historically recognized border search exception" to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement. 3 7 This was generally true with re-
gard to travelers and even packages,' 38 but the general practice with
regard to letters had been much different. As the dissenting justices
pointed out, the practice for over one hundred years had been to have the
addressee present when mail was opened to insure that privacy was
131. Id. at 354.
132. 538 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1976).
133. The court stated:
They variously decide that a border search may be undertaken without a warrant
upon mere suspicion of irregularity; or the "reasonable cause to suspect" used in
the statute (19 U.S.C. §482); or the fact that the search made at the border is itself
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
538 F.2d at 1037.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Five Justices participated in the majority opinion, which was written by Rehn-
quist, J. Burger, C.J., Stewart, White, and Blackmun, J.J. joined therein. Powell, J.,
concurred, and three dissented: Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J. Id.
136. 97 S.Ct. at 1981.
137. Id.
138. See notes 87, 92, 96, 101, 106 and 110 supra and accompanying text.
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respected. 139 The dissent stated that the warrant procedure was also
available if there was sufficient probable cause."40 Further, the Supreme
Court in Katz v. United States141 stated that "searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior judicial approval by judge or magis-
trate, are per se unreasonable." 142
The Court based its decision in part upon the interest of the govern-
ment in national self-protection. 143 However, the cases seem to show that
the border search exception is actually based upon the impracticality of
requiring a warrant due to the tremendous volume of items moving across
the border which may contain contraband, 1" and the difficulty of obtain-
ing a search warrant when the subject of the search is mobile. 145 The
customs service can effectively use such techniques as trained dogs, x-
ray examination, and metal detectors to screen out a large percentage of
mail that would otherwise be opened. 14 Also, since letters are not mobile
in the same sense that automobiles and travelers are, they could be easily
detained for a period of time sufficient to allow a further examination or
to obtain a warrant. 147 True, these procedures may be more inconvenient
than merely opening letters at will, but the Supreme Court has recognized
that "inconvenience alone has never been thought to be an adequate
reason for abrogating the warrant requirementf." 148
The Court reasoned that there was no invasion of free speech
interests since customs officials are prohibited from readiig any corre-
spondence, absent a warrant. 149 However as Justice Holmes noted, "the
use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use
our tongues." 150 Even though the mail is not read, mere knowledge by
individuals of the routine practice of opening mail inhibits the exercise of
free speech. 151 There would be a grave chilling effect on the exercise of
139. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
140. Id.
141. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
142. Id. at 357.
143. 97 S.Ct. at 1979.
144. United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 418 (D.C.Cir. 1976) (citing United States
v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 983 (2d Cir. 1973); Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187, 190 (5th
Cir. 1967)).
145. 538 F.2d at 418; See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
146. 538 F.2d at 419; See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 525 F.2d 1275, 1277 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Chiarito, 507 F.2d 1098, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975).
147. 538 F.2d at 419.
148. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283 (1973).
149. 97 S.Ct. at 1982. See, 19 C.F.R. §145.3 (1976).
150. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921)
(Holmes J., dissenting), quoted with approval in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S.
249, 251 (1970).
151. United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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free speech because if this warrantless opening of letters is allowed,
innocent mail will be opened eight out of ten times.'52 The statutory
history of the authorization for border searches indicates that Congress
never contemplated that 19 U.S.C. § 482 and its predecessors would be
used to give customs officials authority to seize incoming international
letter mail without warrants. There is in fact no historical argument to be
made for warrantless border searches of letter mail. The 105-year-old
practice of customs officials was to open mail only in the presence and
with the consent of the addressees. 15 3 Not until 1971 did the officials
open such mail without a warrant.'-' Since the seizure involved in
Ramsey occurred in 1974, the only "history" involved was a three year
span from 1971 to 1974. This can hardly be said to be a "longstanding
historically recognized exception"1 55 to the fourth amendment. Also, the
Supreme Court itself has recognized that limits on search and seizure
must be especially strong when first and fourth amendment values
converge.' 56 Thus, where constitutionally protected speech was in-
volved, the court has required rigorous adherence to the commands of the
fourth amendment. 157 The Ramsey decision cuts back on that "rigorous
adherence," in favor of the government's interest in self-protection, a
value perceived as outweighing the individual's fundamental rights to
free speech and privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Ramsey has extended the border search doctrine into the area of interna-
tional letter mail and has resolved a conflict among the circuits. The
rights of the individual have yielded to those of the government. Even
when coupled with freedom of speech and the right to privacy, the fourth
amendment right to a warrant obtained upon probable cause for search
and seizure was held inapplicable to international first class mail. Cus-
toms officials have been given free reign to open all incoming interna-
tional letter mail with mere "reasonable cause to suspect."158
152. Brief for Respondent, United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
153. 97 S.Ct. at 1983.
154. Brief for Respondent, United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
155. 97 S.Ct. at 1980.
156. Id. at n.18. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496,502-06 (1973); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
157. Amicus Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union, United States v. Ramsey,
538 F.2d 415 (1976).
158. 97 S.Ct. at 1977.
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International first class mail embodies the same first amendment
interests as does domestic first class mail, which requires a warrant
before it is to be opened. The Supreme Court's sanctioning of the
warrantless opening of international letter mail shows a deterioration of
individual rights in favor of expanded and potentially arbitrary govern-
mental powers. The letter and spirit of the fourth amendment has been
violated. Unless Congress amends the statute construed in this decision,
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